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On the Causes of, and Circumstances attending, the 
Explosion which occurred at Louisa (including Morrison 
Old) Colliery, Durham on 22nd August, 1947 . 
• 
2ISt February, 1948. 
THE RT. HON. HUGU G.\ITSKELL, C.B.E., M.P., 
Minister of Fuel and Power, 
7, )Iillbank. London, S.W.I. 
SIR, 
In accordance with instructions. I beg to submit my report on the circum­
stances of an explosion which occurred at Louisa (including l\lorrison Old) 
Colliery, Durham, when twenty-one persons lost their livcs and three others 
were injured. 
I attended the adjourned Inquest held before 1\Ir. \Vm. CarT, H.M. Coroner 
for the \Vest Chester \Vard of the County of Durham, sitting with a jury of 
nine mc'n, which occupied two whole days. The Coroner gave every facility 
for calling and examining witnesses, and twenty-three were called by him at 
my request. It was agreed by all the parties represented that the Inquest 
had been thorough and exhaustive, and 1 would like here to express my thanks 
to the Coroner for his courtesy in this matter. He recorded the following 
verdict ;-
.. In the case of the nineteen the cause of death was carbon monoxide 
poisoning and accidentaJ death as a result of an explosion of methane 
and air at the Louisa Old Pit, and in the case of the two it was toxaemia 
and circulatory coUapse due to burns accidentally sustained." 
The Foreman stated that the Jury found it had been established that matches 
and cigarettes had been found in the Mornson North Pit and that they would 
like the Press to make an appeal to the men who are carrying on these practices ; 
that they appreciate the difficulties of the deputies in searching Ill.en at the 
commencement of the shift, as those who are so inclined will find a way, but 
they think if there was more co-operation between the management and the 
men these practices would stop. 
• 
I-DESCRIPTION OF THE COLLIERY 
Louisa (including Morrison Old) Colliery was formerly in the South Moor 
group of collieries belonging to the Holmsidc and South I\I00r Collieries Limited 
and is now in the" "Group of No. 6 Area of the Northern Divisi�n of the 
National Coal Board. It is situated at South !\loor, near tanley, III North 
West Durham. and works the middle series of Durham seams, the 1\1audJin, 
Low Main and Hutton, in an area bounded on the \Vest by the outcrop of these 
seams in the Lanchester district. 
The upper seams in the same royalty, namely the Shield Row, Five Quarter 
and Main Coal, are worked from HeeJey Colliery; and both mines have 
a common centrally situated upcast shaft, Charley Fan Shaft, where an 
electrically driven Sirocco fan producing I75.ooo cubic fcet of air per minute 
at zt inches water gauge is situated. 
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The lower se\,lI11S in the same area, namely the Towneley, Busty and Brockwell, 
aTe worked from J\[orrisol1 Busty Colliery, which is a separate mine in the 
same group with its own upcast shaft and fan. 
Louisa Colliery is served by tlu"ce oowncast shafts: Louisa, \Villiam and 
Morrison North, and employs in all 1,480 persons underground and 350 on 
the surface for an average daily output of 1,450 tons. All the output is  wound 
at Louisa shaft apart from a certain amount of overflow coal at l\1orrison 
North shaft. 
General Supervisioll. :\Iany changes in the plincipaJ officials had been brought 
about following public ownership of the mines from 1St January last, and on 
2211d August, the day of the explosion, they were comprised as follows :-
�Ir. \\'111. \Velsh . . .  
:'IlL G. 1-1. Braithwaite 
�1 r. ]. F. Meek 
Mr. R. Peel 
�Ir. R. Simpson 
No. 6 Area General Manager 
Agent, " C " Group 
l\'1anager, Lo�isa Colliery 
Undermanager of Louisa and \\'i1liam 
Sections of Louisa Colliery 
Undermanager of Mortison North Section 
of Louisa Colliery 
A third undennanager, :'IlL E. W. )tarshall, who was normally in charge 
of \\"illiam Section and had been temporarily withdrawn to act as manager 
of another mine in the group, had acted as manager during the month of 
July, 1947, prior to which Mr. J.  E. Bragan had been manager for four years; 
and �lr. Meek had been in charge from 1St August only. 
1\lr. \Vm. \\'elsh was formerly chief mining engineer for the South Moor group : 
he was trained at these collieries and was manager at Louisa Colliery for 
some yeil-rs, and he has an intimate and detailed knowledge of the underground 
workings and conditions. "Ir. Braithwaite was appointed agent on 1St March 
last. Messrs. �Iarshall, Peel and Simpson had also been employed in the 
South �Ioor group for some years. 
Each section of the colliery had its own complement of ovennen covering 
the period from 3 a.m. to 1 1 .30 p.m. daily, and the uncovered period of the 
night ..,hift was under the sole charge of a master-shifter whose hours were 
from IQ p.m. to 6 a.m. On the Friday night in question, however, the fore 
shift overman, John Hutchinson, of the Louisa Section, had commenced his 
Saturday shift at 12 midnight in accordance with established routine, and he 
took an important part in the rescue operations, as will be described later . 
• 
Safety Lamps. Apart from the use of safety lamps as a precautionary 
mea�urc inbye in certain districts (for a reason now unknown) in the Low 
Main and Hutton Seams, open lights were used up to 19 . .j.I i n  aU seams down 
to and induding the Huttoll. During that year, following a suggestion by 
the then Divisional Inspector, who had drawn attention to the fact that 
workmcrf)were hiding matches and other contraband on a main intake haulage 
road serving onc of the safety lamp sections and had pointed out the fire 
hazard (a serious fire in the Low Main Seam in 1929 had been caused by an 
acetylene lamp), the Chief Mining Engineer, Mr. \Vrn. \Velsh, decided to ins�all 
safety lamps throughout the Louisa Old and \Villiam sections, excludlOg 
the l\1orrison North section of shallow work under more or less \\'et conditions 
approaching the outcrop. The full im�hcations of safety lamps were accepted 
in these two areas in respect of seuching persons, the application of Part II 
of the principal Explosives in Coa] Mines Order. and the use of certified flame 
proof elect rical apparat us and firedamp detectors. 
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It �hould be stated here that the 4th North District. which is within half a 
mile of the MorTison i\'orth shaft and over It miles Cr m Louis.'\ shaft, was 
formerly in the open light area of Morrison North, but in order to meet the 
workmen's claim that HHS district should be included in the Louisa \Vorkmen's 
Lodge. it was placed under the jurisdiction of the Loui� Undennanagcr and 
worked with safety lamps. 
Hullo" Stam. The seam at this colliery averages 2t rt. in thickness, with 
a strong shale roof and a seggar floor. It has a volatile maller content on an 
ash· free dry basis of 33' 7 per cent. and yields a high quality gas coal. It 
has been worked very extensively and little remains to br extracted in the 
royally. The 4th North District comprises a small area of the seam sterilised 
by a fire in 1929 in the Low Main Seam lying 30 ft. above, which had neces­
sitated the sealing off of a pil1ared area of about 100 acres in this upper seam. 
During 1944 the fire area was entered and new seals were erected nearer to 
the locus of the old fire. This made available for working the area of Hutton 
seam referred to above and the lower seams under the area to be worked from 
Morrison Busty Colliery. Plan No. I shows the position of the sealed area in 
relation to the 4th North District. There is no record of inflammable gas 
ha\-ing �en found in the seam prior to this explosion. 
l l-FOURTH NORTH DISTRICT 
1n this district the depth to the Hutton Seam is about 450 Ct. and the general 
direction of full dip is I in 29 slightly south of e2st. 
Plan No. 2 shows that the small area of solid coal to be worked was bounded 
on all four sides either by goaf or hord and pillar workings. 
The area was entered at its north end by means of a I in 6 dip stone drift 
driven due east from the 4th North Low Main Haulage I�oad, and It,s con­
tinuation in the seam skirted whole workings on the north side. From this 
east headin/? a heading was driven southwards through the heart of the area 
and won out longwall faces to the east and west. By August, 1947, 
four conveyor faces had been worked to the west to a barrier line fixed to 
protect the 4th North Low Main Haulage Road; two conveyor faces had 
been worked up to and connected with the old \Vemblcy gateway face: and 
two other faces, the Straight East and 2nd East, were being worked to the 
east. The traight East face was the first conveyor face to be started in 
the district but it had been stopped in eptemiJer, 19-16, on account of very 
wet natural conditions and was not re·started until July, 1947, by which time 
it had become dry. To the south of the 2nd East face there were two tub 
gateway faces working the naITO\\;ng strip of coal between the 2nd East face 
and the barrier being left to support the Low Main Cross·cut I-L\ulage Road 
to Louisa shaft. 
All the coal in this district was hewed with air picks and shots had never 
been fired in the coal. Top rippings were shot down in all the road ways and 
the roof on the conveyor faces caved regularly between the gateside packs. 
All the conveyor machinery and a small hauler on the South Heading were 
electrically driven, but one small pump in the East Motor bord old right face 
was driven by compres30ed air. The two face conveyors were of the chain 
type: the Straight East conveyor delivering on to a chain conveyor in the 
gate, and the 2nd East conveyor on to a belt conveyor delivering into tubs 
on the South Heading. The tubs were hauled from both load.ing points 
by rope haulage. Chain conveyors had also been employed on Nos. 3, 4 and 
5 old West bords. 
A 1 
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FetllilatiQ1l. The district was ventilated by a split from the 4th North 
Low .J\I�in Haulage Road leading from Morrison �orth shaft, and owing to its 
�roxllmty to the upeast shaft the quantity of air passing was heavily regulated, 
(I) at the \Vembley connection by a cloth fixed across a wood door which had 
been damaged by roof weighting, and (ii) on the North Heading return ainvay 
off the Straight East gate by the usual type of wood regulator door. 
The quantity recorded on 18th August as entering the district was 9,040 eu. ft. 
-per minute. The alT was coursed by means of canvas cloths into the South 
Heading, up No. I \\'est bord and then around the district, as shown on Plan 
No.!. Roughly half this quantity was allowed to pass into the return at the 
\Vembley connection, and the remainder (a measured quantity of 4,135 cu. ft.) 
ventilated the Straight East face and gate on its way out to the North Heading 
return airway. 
o measurement had been taken of the air current at or near a point in the 
airway ten yards on the intake side of the first working place, as required 
by No. 6 (c) of the Coal Mines (Ventilation) General Regulations, 1947, but 
the quantity entering this return airway had been recorded on 18th August 
as being 4,820 cu. ft. per minute, which indicated little leakage thrcugh the 
heavy canvas cloth across the short length of the Straight East gate.between 
the district main intake and the return airway. 
I return to this matter later in this report, but it can be stated that the amount 
of air ventilating the district under normal conditions (with the canvas cloths 
in proper working order) was adequate. 
Jlforkiflg Arra1lgemeflts. The district was worked by a succession of shifts 
commencing at 3 a.m. on ;\Ionday and ending at 6.30 a.m. on Saturday in 
each week. Four shifts of workmen and three shifts of deputies (one on each 






3 a.m. to 10.30 a.m. 
9.30 a.m. to 5 p.m. 
4 p.m. to II.30 p.m. 
ro.o p.m. to 5.30 a.m. 
and 
lLO p.m. to 6.30 a.m. 
Deputies 
2 a.m. to 10.30 a.m. 
10 a.m. to 6.30 p.m. 
6 p.l11. lo 2.30 a.m. 
The arrangement of work in the district was rather complicated. Coal was 
produced on all shifts except the night shift. On the Straight East face, 
40 yards long, six hewer::; completed a daily advance at the face of about 4t ft. 
in onc �hift, which changed on a weekly rotation; and on the 2nd East f�ce, 
60 yards long, hewers were employed on the two other of the three coahng 
shift::;. rn the two tub gateways hewers were employed on all the three coal 
shift�. Conveyor movers and the conveyor gate canchmen came in on the 
shift immediately foUowing the coal loading shifts, which meant they worked 
any of the four shifts in different weeks. On the night shift were employed 
the gateway canchmen, back canchmen and gate conveyor extenders, and men 
cleaning up spillage and stonedusting; while two stone driUers were usually 
employed between about 7 p.m. and 12 midnight. Since the introduction of the 
s-day week some of the men normally employed on the Friday fore or back 
shifts were liable to be brought in at II o'clock the same night. 
On Monday of each week the fore-shift deputy made a pre-shift inspecti�n, 
after which work was continuous for the week and each of the three deputies 
made two during-shift inspections and entered a repOJt on each during. his shift. The overlap of the three shifts was sufficient to enable them to relieve 
each other at the meeting station in the district. 
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On Friday evening of each week the deputies came on shift earlier and on 
the day of the explosion, Friday, 2211d August, the back shift deputy was 
J. \V. i\[aughan from 10 a.m. to 6.30 p.'"!l' (as usual) and the night shift deputy 
was T. Hebden from 4 p.m. to 11.30 p.m. This deputy, however, reached the 
surface at Morrison North shaft at 1I.20 p.m. a.nd there met the fore shift 
deputy, John EsteU (one of the victims), who should have descended at tr p.m. 
Before he left the district Hcbden arranged prO\'jsionally with a deputy in 
charge of another district to take charge if Estell eventuaUy failed to turn up. 
All the third shift had left at about the same time as deputy Hebdcl1, and 
the persons on shift in the district about 11.55 p.m. when the explosion 
occurred were as follows :-
(a) Two stone drillers, Johnson and KilgaUon, who had descended Louisa 
shaft and were admitted to the district by deputy Hebden at 7 p.rn. 
(b) Men who had descended Morrison North shaft at 10 p.m. and were 
admitted to the district by Hebden at 10.20 p.rn. :-
Three conveyor movers, Bell, Chapman and Fenwick: t o  advance 
the 2nd Ea:;t face conveyor; 
Two stonemen, Appleby and Rowland: to take out a low girder 
on the South Heading out bye of 2nd East loading point; and 
Two other stonemen, Simpson and Brown: t o  continue a c3nch 
along the \Vest face line towards the inbye tailgate. 
(c) Men who had descended at II p.m. and had reached their working 
places after deputy Hebden had left, probably before deputy Esteli 
had arrived at the kist :-
Two stonemen, Bailey and Talbot: t o  renew a .. war rick .. girder 
near the outbye cnd of the Straight East loading gate; 
Two other stonemen, Minto and \Vestgarth: to complete the 
re-aligning of the Straight East gate conveyor and clean up; 
Three datal hands, Reed, Moore and Bell: to clean up on 2nd 
East loading gate; 
Three other datal.hands, l\kKever, Roe and Martin: to repair 
the rail track on the South Heading outbye the 2nd East loading 
point; and 
Four stonernen, Hodgson, Grimley and Rutherford, and Birtle : 
to canch the 2nd East loading gate, the 2nd East tailgate, and the 
inhye tub gateways respectively. 
(d) The deputy, Estell, who had reached the kist at the meeting station 
within a few minutes of the occurrence. 
Four of the fourteen men who came on shift at 1I p.m. had already worked 
on the fore shift, and four others on the back shift, of the same day. There 
were thus eight additional persons to the normal night shift on shift at the time. 
Each of these men carried an Edison "J" electric cap lamp. Deputy 
Estell also had his flame safety lamp, but none of the men carried a flame 
lamp gas detector, as required by the rule of the colliery. Deputy HC'bden 
states that he reported this fact to Estell at the surface, but apparently Estell 
took no action in the matter and his flame lamp was the only gas detector 
in the district at the time of the explosion. 
itlspcciio1ls Of� Day of Explos1·ott. On the fore shift of 22nd August, the day 
of the explosion, fore overman John Hutchinson had inspected the whole of 
the district, including the \Vest face line, and had found the ventilation very 
satisfactory and free from firedamp. 
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Deputy Maughan found no firedamp during {he back shift, nor did deputy 
Hebden on the third shift ; and overman T. Amos had also tested and found 
the face ripping lip of the Straight East gate clear a.s late as 10 p.m., two hours 
before the explosion occurred. Furthermore, as previously stated, there was 
no history of inflammable gas haYing been found in this district or in the 
Hutton Seam at this colliery. The two drillers who had left the inbye East 
faces about fifteen minutes before the explosion also stated that the conditions 
seemed to be normal at that time. 
rrr-�ARR.\Tr\'E OF THE EXPLOSIOX 
The explo�ion occurred at 11.55 p.m. during the first and second hours of 
the fourth or night shift of Friday, 22nd August, 1947-
All the twcnly·four persons at work in the district were involved: nineteen 
were found dead, and of the five recovered alive two subsequently dieci. None 
of the other 192 persons employed elsewhere in the mine at the time were 
affected. A full list of the casualties is given in Appendix 1. 
Discovery allt! Reswe Work. The first persons to raise the alarm and to 
reach t he scene of the explosion were a party of three deputies, \V. Younger, 
J. Shanley and Hy. Robinson, all trained rescue men, who were regularly 
employed in the adjacent fire area previously mentioned. This party usually 
carried a canary and flame lamp detectors, and they had with them a reviving 
apparatus for use in case of emergency. They had examined the fire stoppings 
alongside the 4th North Low Main Main Hoad on their way inbye from 
l\lorrison North shaft and had just reached their station in the fire area about 
250 yards to the south of and beyond the off takes for the 4th North District, 
when they felt a momentary cessation of the intake air, followed immediately 
by a rush of dust laden air coming in a normal direction from �Iorrison North 
shaft. This occurred at 11.55 p.m. according to Younger's watch. They 
realised fully what this denoted, and they picked up the canary and their 
flame lamps and ran northwards in the direction of the Morrison :\forth shaft 
towards the seat of the trouble, which they soon discovered was in the 4th 
);orth District. Shanley then returned to the 4th Bankhead and telephoned 
this information to the surface, while Younger and Robinson entered the 4th 
l\orth District, taking the canary with them. They went first into the Straight 
East gate through the heavy canvas cloth (which they state positively was 
intact), where they saw a Light and heard moaning sounds ahead, and about 
thirty yards farther on they found one man (Minto) alive but unconscious 
and two others (Bailer and TalOOt) apparently dead. 
Robinson went back to the 4th North offtakes to telephone urgently for 
help <lI1d to get a stretcher for the injured man l\Iinto, with whom Younger 
remained. It  was then 12.20 a.m. by Younger',) watch. Younger discovered 
that another of the men (BaiJey) was alive, so he went to meet Robinson 
returning with the stretcher and sent him to fetch the reviving apparatus 
from the fire area. Robinson soon returned with Shanley and the fore-overman, 
John Hutchinson, who had descended Morrison North shaft at midnight and 
had been informed of Shanley's telephone message. 
Younger and Shanley then recovered the three men in t he Straight East 
gate, while Hutchinson and Robinson attempted to explore the South Heading, 
but the air was at that time too hot and thick with fumes to enable them to 
proceed very far. However, ;]. little later on, and without effecting any repairs 
to canvas cloths, these four men were able to get along this Heading as far 
as the 2nd East loading point and up the 2nd East loading gate as far as the 
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face line. The cloths across the old East gate had been disarranged and the 
one across the 2nd East gate had been destroyed. They came a.cross the two 
drillers, Johnson and Kilgallon, both alive but unconscious at the dcputirs' 
kisl, and they brought them our to fresh air. 
By the time the first rescue team arrived in the district, 3t about 1.30 a.m., 
these men had also recovered deputy Estell stll! ali\'c at the kist and had brought 
out five dead bodies from the South Heading, and they had located four bodies 
in the 2nd East loading gate. An attempt was also made by them to get to 
the loading point on the Straight East gate, where they could see signs of fire, 
but the fumes werc too heavy for them to make any progress. They were 
not at that time aware there were any men on the \Vest side. but in any event 
the canvas cloth across the South Heading to divert the air current into 
No. I \Vest bord had been destroyed and this side was consequently fouled with 
afterdamp. 
About this time the Undennanager. Mr. Peel, arrived on the scene and took 
charge of the operations. Rescue teams quickly located the remaining bodies 
on the South Heading beyond the 2nd East loading point, on the 2nd East loading 
gate beyond the face line, and on the West side; while another rescue team 
entered the Straight East gate, where they came across \Vc!:itgarth, with his 
clothing on fire. just beyond the loading point. Other clothing there and a 
wood chock carrying the com'eyor gearhead were smouldering. They 
extinguished these incipient fires with sand and brought out the body of 
\Vestgarth, after which the fumes in the gate quickly dissipated. 
There were no falls of ground seriously impeding the ventilation, which was 
speedily restored by rc-er�cting the cloths across the South Heading and the 
2nd East loading gate and rene\\;ng those on the old East gates, and the 
remaining bodies were recovered without the aid of rescue apparatus. 
The exact positions of the dead and injured persons when recovered are �hown 
on Plan No. I. 
The clothing on the nineteen bodies was examined at the surface for contra­
band by a Police Tnspector in tbe presence of an [nspector of Mines and repre­
sentatives of the National Coal Board and the Miners' Lodge; and cigarette!' 
and matches, including onc pocket petrol tighter, were found on eight of them. 
I refer to this matter later in this report. 
Exploration oJ lite District. This was possible within a few hours of the 
explosion, at which time the Undermanager found a small accumulation of 
firedamp in a roof cavity at a 3 ft. fault at the roadhead of No. 4 \Vest bord, 
which he describes as four per cent. at about onc foot from the roof but which 
was not discernible in the general body of the air. This had dispersed by the 
following day. 
. 
It was soon evident that coal dust had played the major part in the explosion; 
indeed, in view of the amount of coking and of the previous hbtory of the seam 
at this colliery. it was at first thought the explosion had bt'cn one of coal dust 
only and that firedamp had not entered into the matter at all. Investigation 
showed, however, there was no evidence that any preformed cloud 01 du .... l 
had been created at the outset or that there had been any igniting medium of 
sufficient intensity to initiate a coal dust explosion. 
The details of the after-effects in the district are given on Plan No. I, and 
the main indications of the passage of flame and blast are described below. 
On the Straight East gate there was pronounced coking- on the roof supports 
etc. from the roadhead back down the gate as far as the North Heading return 
airway, where the regulator door had been blown out. l\Iinto, one of the 
• 
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survivors, stated that he and his mate \Vestgarth had just reached the loading 
point, 30 yards back from the coal face, at the commencement of their shift 
and that they were undressing when he "heard a bang ", but he cannot 
recollect anything more. He was found afterwards 50 yards outbye and near 
io two other men, Talbot and Bailey. These men had not arrived there when 
�linto first entered the gate with \\'estgarth and he cannot explain how he 
came to be found at this point afterwards. 
There were no signs of coking along the Straight East face or along the old 
East face line hut there were deposits of burnt d\tst, indicating the passage 
of flame, which increased progressively in amount as far as and intc the old 
roadhead of the 2nd East gate. The only signs of force along this face line 
were the complete shattering of the regulator door at the \Vembley connection 
and the displacement of roof baulks with a fall of roof about the old road head, 
through which there was still a good passageway for the air current. 
The tailgate of the Straight East face was unaffected, but the old East Motor 
bard conveyor gate was heavily coked, especially about its centre. 
On the 2nd East loading gate from the old roadhead the burnt dust depo<;it 
merged into coking up to about 20 yards inbye the 2nd East face line. From 
this point out bye to the South Heading there was increasingly heavy coking 
on the inbye side of the props, and the delivery end of the face conveyor was 
heavily coked . The canvas cloth across the out bye end of this gate had been 
destroyed and the conveyor motor gear, switches and cables had been blown 
across the South Heading into the mouth of No. 4 \Vest bord opposite. 
The bodies of Moore, Reed and Bell (Xo. I) were, found alongside the gate 
conveyor on this road, and two of them were lying with their heads out bye as 
if they had been caught by a blast coming down the gate; and the body of 
Hodgson was found with both legs fractured beyond the 2nd East face line. 
On the \Vest side there was no sign of the passage of flame or blast in the 
inbye tail gate, where the bodies of Grimley, Rutherford and Birtle, face 
canchmen from the 2nd East side, were found; they had sustained no violence 
and death was due to carbon monoxide poisoning only. The first signs of 
coking were beyond the roof canch which Brown and Simpson were taking 
from No. 5 \Vest bord towards the tail gate. and the body of Simpson was 
found with burning injuries farther out bye along the face line. Down No. 5 
\Vest bard there was coking on the face side of the timbers and in this gate 
was found the body of Brown, also with burning injuries. 
In No. 4 \Vest bord, which is opposite the 2nd East loading gate, there 
was coking on the east side of the timbers but no signs of violence. Out bye 
along the face line there was again heavy coking on the south side of the props 
and lighter coking along the incompleted new return airway and down 
No. I \Vest bard almost to its junction with the South Heading. There was also 
considerable sooting and slight coking in the old No. 2 "-est bard (which had a 
dirt stopping at its inbye end), in which the deputies' kist was situated. He.rt: 
two survivors, John5On and Kilgallon, after having completed their shift 
drilling shotholes in the East gates, had been sitting for a few minutes talking 
to deputy Estell when they were" attacked by flame "; but neither of them 
can recollect anything afterwards. 
On the South I-reading there was very slight intermittent coking on both 
sides of the timbers from "N'o. I to No_ 5 \Vest bards. Three empty tubs 
of a set standing on the landing opposite No. I \Vest bord had been tipped 
over on their sides towards the east, long timbers in the mouth of No. 5 
'West bard had been blown out against full tubs standing on tlle heading and 





the east. The body of hapman was found here in a crouching position facing 
outbye, crushed between one of the di�placed tubs and the side and the bodie� 
of his two mates, Fenwick and Bell (No. 2), were found a few yards outbye 
along the Heading. The driller Johnson recalls having passed these men on 
this part of the heading when he came out bye at the cnd of his shift; they 
had partly completed the advancing of the conveyor along the 2nd East face 
and it can only be conjectured what they were doing on the heading at this 
time. 10hn50n thought they were looking for timber. The bodies of Applcby 
and Rowland were found just out bye the 2nd East loading point and those of 
McKever, Roe, and Martin about 30 yards out bye ; alUhese men were lying 
as if they had been knocked down by an outward blast along the Heading. 
The evidence was clear that the explosion had not traversed the 2nd E�t 
face or any part of the tub gateways or roadways at the inbye end of the 
South Heading. On the other hand it is significant that it had swept through­
out all the conveyor roadways, both existing and disused (but still accessible). 
The explosion bad developed remarkably little violence, doubtless due to 
the relatively small quantity of combustible matter in the atmosphere, coupled 
with the absence of long lengths of roads along which pre�ure could build up 
and to the opportunity for dispersal of the force of an e�plosion, both in front 
of and behind the flame, provided by the South Heading and the \Vest face 
line; and the comparatively slow travel of the flame had evidently caused 
the unusually extensive coking to be observed. 
It is, I think, reasonable to deduce from this evidence that a mild firedamp 
explosion in which coal dust played no part at first had traversed the East 
face line between the Straight East loading gate and the 2nd East loading 
gate and had extended outbye along these gates and the intermediate East 
Motor bord, so as to open up several separate coal dust explosions; one in 
each of the gates. The most violent of these dust explosions occurred on the 
2nd East loading gate and this erupted violently into the South Heading and 
continued up No. 4 \Vest bord opposite to tue \Vest face line, where it spread 
leftwards as far as the tailgate and to the right down 'No. I \Vest bord to the 
South Heading, and there died out. 
The PrcsclIce of Firedamp. It is necessary at this stage to discuss how 
1I1flammable gas came to be present 111 dangerous quantity in the 4th North 
Di::;trict, having regard to the previous history of the seam at the colliery. 
There was subsequent evidence of the presence of firedamp on the \Vest 
side in the roof cavity alreagy mentioned; and on 27th August, five days 
later, Inspectors of Mines and the Undermanager found a larger accumulation 
at the roadhead corner of the inbye \Vest tailgate, which tailed out some 
yards along the face line and down the gate. About three hours later it was 
found this gas had been dispersed by the normal air current, and an 
unsuccessful endeavour was made by short-circuiting the air to ascertain its 
actual point of issue. 
In view of the proximity of old workings on all sides of the 4th North District 
any emission of gas from the Hutton Seam itself can, I consider, be ruled out; 
and the Low M<\in Seam 30 ft. above had been pillared in the area for over 
twenty years and any gas occluded in the strata above the Hutton Seam 
would have drained away during this period . 
. The suggestion was made by the workmen's representatives that combustible 
gas other than methane from the fire area in the Low Main Seam distilled 
by the heat inside the area now sealed, where the temperature is known to 




This was extremely unlikely and moreonr, 1\lr. E. \V. ;'Iluddiman, Chief 
Scientist for 1\'0. 6 Area, was able to state positively at the Inquest that the 
air samples collected in the West tailgate on 27th August contained no com­
bustible gas other than methane ; which disposes of this theory. 
This leaves only the strata below the Hutton Seam to be considered. 
In considering possible reasons for the presence of an inflammable mixture 
of firedamp and air on the East face line and the Straight East gate, two 
important factors have to be taken into account :-
(r)  The unsatisfactory arrangement of the single cloth across the outer 
end of the Straight East gate, on the short length separating the intake 
and return air at this rather vital point. 
Any derangement of this cloth would allow intake air to short-circuit 
to the return and affect adversely the ventilating pressure creating circula­
tion of air in this part of the district. Alternatively, a similar disturbance 
of the regulator cloth at the Wembly connection would have the same 
effect ; and either or both of these events would considerably reduce the 
quantity of air coursing this part of the district and could even produce 
stagnation o f  the air. 
There was no dirl.'ct evidence of any failure of the ventilating arrange­
ments, but they were sufficiently precarious to warrant being taken into 
coO!,ideration for this purpose. ' 
(2) Disturbance of the st;ata below the Hutton Seam by abutment 
pressure brought about by the working of the lower seams, which can 
cause firedamp to be liberated from these seams or wastes and at the same 
time provide a relatively easy upward path for tJle gas-a not unknown 
occurrence at other mines in this country. There� were no indications 
of floor breaks, apart from fault slips in the 4th Xorth District, but it is 
the fact that water made in the Hutton Seam percolates through to the 
Towneley workings below. 
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I n  this particular area the Towneley Seam, 26 ins. thick and 55 yds. below, 
had been worked since 19-16 and a longwall face wa!) being advanced northwards; 
and the Bottom Busty Seam, 3 ft. I in. thick and a further 33 yds. below, 
had been worked in 1931 and again in 1946. There are also two thin unworked 
seams between the Busty and the Towneley Seam. A section of the seams 
is given on Plan No. 2.  
The relati\'e positions of the workings in the Hutton Seam and those of the 
two lower seams in the area arc shown in Plan No. 2,  from which it will be 
s�t.'n that those in the Towncley Seam had increased the span of the worked-out 
area from west to east and that a face advancing to the north was widening 
the span from south to north. At a certain stage in this expansion of the 
worked-out area an increased rate of general settlement was inevitable, and 
accompanying this there would be increased pressure at the abutments 
sUHounding this area. These effecls would be transmitted to the Busty 
Seam waste below. Furthennore, it will also be seen from the same plan 
that there had been an abutment in the Busty Seam from 1931 to 19-16, which 
would have the effect of further disturbing the strata: 
I t seems probable that such action did occur and caused firedamp to issue 
from these lower seams and workings, and could account for the firedamp 
found on the \Vest side after the explosion. The firedamp involved in tfle 
explosion may well have issued under the same influence on the East side, 
particularly where the various abutment pressures meet to the north of the 




If this action caused only a very small rate of issue of firedamp of a few 
cubic (cet per minute, which would not be detectable on the reduced Aame 
. of a safety lamp with the normal aiT current flowing, any interruption in the 
ventilating arrangements from onc or other of the possible caus!.'s mentioned 
above (I) would in a comparatively short period bring about a firedamp-air 
mixture above the lower limit of inflammability i n  this part of the district. 
I am not unmindful of the evidence that firedamp was found afterwards 
at two points on the \Vest side before the ventilation wa� fully re::.tored. but 
having regard to the fact there was something of the order of 9.000 eu. Ct. of 
air per minute coursing this side and the inbye East side, it would be necessary 
to postulate a very high rate of emission of firedamp in this part of the district 
to brillg about an explosive mixture in the air current-a mo:::.t unlikely event 
in the circumstances. Any disturbance of the cloth on the Straight East gate 
would not affect seriously the amount of air coursing this part of the district, 
and any similar derangement of the cloth regulator at the Wembley connection 
would cOI�siderably increase this quantity. 
I am t herefore forced to the conclusion, in the absence of any other fCrtsible 
explanation of the source and presence of this inflammable mixture on the 
East side, that the firedamp came from the lower workings and that the locus 
of the emission was on that part of the East face line immediately on the return 
side of the �\'embley connection, where the area would be above the most 
intense abutment pressure zone i n  the Towneley Seam. The evidence of 
increased violence at this place indicates a richer inflammable mixture there. 
The colliery records of air samples show that the TowneJey Seam gives off 
firedamp but that it cannot be described as a gassy seam, although occasionally 
trouble is experienced with firedamp in the workings of this seam , 'the Bu�ty 
earn, on the other hand, is rather gassy. 
The colliery barograph shows that for some days prior to, and at the time 
of, the explosion the barometer had stood at a consistently high le\'el. 
IV- AUSE OF THE EXPLOSIO:\ 
After the explosion a thorough search for contraband in the district was 
made by two Inspectors of Mines, accompanied by the Manager a.nd Under­
manager and two representatives of the workmen. Cigarettes. matches and 
one pocket petrol lighter were found, some in the pockets and clothing belonging 
to the persons killed in the explosion, some in tins hidden near the working 
places, 26 spent matches and three cigarette ends beneath and behind the 
deputies' kist, and other contraband lying exposed on the floor near the delivery 
end of the Straight East gate conveyor. 
The points in the district where contraband was found are marked on Plan I .  
and 1 ha\'e previously mentioned other contraband found in the clothing on 
some of the bodies examined at thp surface. 
The condition of the contraband found at the kist and in clothing and closed 
tins elsewhere did not indicate smoking on the night of the explosion at these 
points, but that found openly exposed in the Straight East gate was m�t 
significant. It consisted of two whole but slig-htly dmnaged cigarettes in an 
open and damaged cigarette case, three badly damaged cigarettes lying outside 
the case and a spent match, all lying close together in the full tub track near 
the loading point. A short distance away there was a whole cigarette which 
had not been lighted but had one cnd slightly damaged, as if it had been placed 
in the mouth ready for lighting. This, in my view, presents conclusive evidence 




All other likely igniting causes of the explosion can be eliminated. No 
shotfiring was being carried on at the time ; in fact the exploder and shotfiring 
cable were found stored at the kist, and here the two drillers were discussing 
with deputy Estell the shots to be fired later by him, when the explosion 
occurred . .  
I t is most unlikely that any of the electrical apparatus was in operation at 
the time. In any event it was all of certified lype and a thorough examination 
by l'Ilr. F. T. J-linelley, H.M. Electrical Inspector of Mines, of all the equipment 
revealed no fault that could have been the igniting source ; and the signalling 
bells and telephone receivers, which were impounded and forwarded for tcst t o  
the Ministry of Fuel and Power Research and Testing Branch at Sheffield, were 
abo found to be in safe working order. 
All the t\",·enty.four cap lamps, and the one deputy's flame lamp, were also 
sent to the Testing Branch at Sheffield, and all but six of the cap lamps were 
found to be in good lighting order and safe. The damaged lamps were attached 
to men who had been subjected to violence all the 2nd East gate or the South 
Heading and the damage in each case was clearly due to the force of the 
explosion. The flame lamp was also found t o  be i n  safe working order, and 
ignition by any of these lamps can therefore be ruled out. 
As it is known that under certain conditions it is possible to obtain sparking 
at a leaking compressed air joint or hose, the compressed air pump on the 
East face line and the pipe mains throughout the district- were carefully tested 
and found to be in good order after the explosion. 
C oflciusiolls. 
I have accordingly come to the conclusion that during the night shift of 
Friday, 22nd August, 1947, there was an emission of firedamp from the strata 
below the Hutton Seam, which created an inflammable mixture of firedamp 
and air on the East face line and the Straight East gate ; that shortly before 
midnight a lucifer match struck about the loading point on the Straight East 
gate for the purpose of lighting a cigarette ignited this mixture and initiated 
a very mild firedamp explosion, which developed additional force as it progressed 
and which was propagated by coal dust along the mechanised roadways, both 
existing and disused, throughout the district ; and that the e;...'-plosion was 
finally extingui!)hed by stcnedu!)t on the South Heading and the Main Drift. 
\"-MATTERS ARISING OUT OF THE EXPLOSroN 
Coal Dust. The Hutton Seam in the 4th North District is not a very dry 
and dusty seam, and wet conditions are met with at times, but the air picks 
used by the hewers produce coal dust, the fmest of which is air-bome and 
deposited at the return ends of the faces, where the loading points in both 
conveyor gate!; were placed. This dust, added to that deposited during coal 
loading operations, would thus increase the difficulty of maintaining these 
places constantly in compliance with the Coal Dust General Regulations, 1939· 
There was evidence to show that the management were alive to the 
importance of dealing with the coal dust at these points. On 16th August 
40 bags (4 tons) of shale stonedust were spread in the district, and after the 
roadways had been cleaned up on the nights of the I9th and 20th August a 
further 40 bags of stonedust were spread throughout the roadways, including 
the two loading gates, on the following night of 21st August ; but it is to be 
noted that subsequent to the treatment the Straight East face had been 
worked on the first shift and the 2nd East face on the second and third shifts ; 
and the cleaners-up were just about commencing their work i n  bo�h gates 
when the explosion occurred. 
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Four days after the explosion, nineteen samples of the dust on lhe road ways 
in the district were collected by an Tnspeetor of l\'1ines, and the d�tails of the 
results of the analyses of these samples are given in Appendix f r .  Admittedly. 
in view of the bl�t which had swept the district these results do not represent 
the conditions obtaining before the explosion, but they do, in my view, give 
some indication that the floor of the conveyor roadways as a whole was in 
doubtful compliance with the Regulations al lhe time. However that may be, 
the disquieting fact remains that a coal dust explosion swept throughout all the 
existing and disused conveyor road ways in the district, with the contrasting 
difference that neither of the conveyor faces nor the hand-worked faces and 
roadways were affected ; and this exemplifies the additional hazard horn 
coal-dust brought about by mechanised mining. 
Furthermore. a sample of the coal dust ground from the Hutton Seam was 
found on test for inH.ammability at the Research and Testing Branch at 
Sheffield to require 69 per cent. total incombustible matter content to prevent 
inflammation, as compared wlth the 65 per cent. minimum required for this 
seam by the Regulations. 
The stonedust in use was ground at the colliery from shale from the under­
. ground workings and a sample tested at Sheffield for fractionation and dispers­
ability was found satisfactory. In my view the evidence shows this stonedust 
had functioned satisfactorily in arresting the explosion. 
The accumulations of dust apparently rich in coaly matter found on the 
floor after the explosion in all the disused �?nveyor gates indicate that these 
roads should have been cleaned up more thoroughly. In this connection 
I would point out that No. 3 of the Coal Dust Regulations 1939, in requiring 
the taking of such measures .. for the prevention, suppression, collection �nd 
removal of coal dust and for treating it with incombustible dust or in any other 
manner approved " includes " evcry road or part of a road which is accessible " ; 
and that No. 7, in calling for the systematic clearing of the dust on the floor 
of every conveyor road, includes " the space beneath the conveyor ". 
The arrangements in respect of frequency of treatment in the 4th :North 
District of the working roadways in the district were good up to a point, but 
i t  may well have been (and 1 think it probably was the case) that after two 
coaling shifts had been worked there since it had been last treated the 2nd East 
gate was not up to the required standard. 
. 
Dust sampling had been carried out in accordance with the Coal Dust Regu­
lations, but monthly sampling.on conveyor roadways, especially in the vicinity 
of the loading point, where the conditions can deteriorate considerably in the 
course of a loading shift, clearly gives no real guide to the position in respect 
of coal dust. 
Under the existing Regubtions conveyor roadways are not necessarily 
sampled each calendar month ; and therefore, in effect, treatment is decided 
on the result of a visual inspection. It is true that in many instances where 
very dusty c;:onditions prevail the treatment is '3ystematic, but this may well 
not be sufficient, and managers should make it a ruJe to have these roadways 
sampled at very frequent intervals to provide themselves with a truer picture 
of the position �nd fO enable them to decide on the extent and frequency of 
treatment necessary to ensure compliance at all times with the Regulations. 
In this connection, however, it is necessary to point out the da.nger of exposed 
layers of coal dust. Experiments carried out at the Research and Te�ting 
Branch with a highly inflammable coal dust (similar to the Hutton 
Seam) have established that a mild expl sion, initiated by an igniting source 
of low violence-the conditions which obtained in this explosion-may be 
• propagated by a coal dust which it raises from a surface Inyer only 4/looths 
• 
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of an inch thick, even where the coal dust rests on a stone dust deposit nine 
tllnes its own weight ; and this result was obtained on separate tests with 
three different types of stone dust. This danger can only be countered by the 
frequent application of stone dust in smalJ amounts. 
There is no Immediate remedy other than the continual cleaning up and 
application of stoncdu�t at these places, except that the amount of breakage 
and spillage of the coal while being conveyed and transferred should be reduced 
to a minimum ; and :,hrouding the delivery and transfer points, and the use 
of water sprays, should be adopted morc generally. 
But there is no doubt that the only solution (known at present) to the 
problem lies in the application of water for the suppression of coal du�t at 
the source : either in t he form of infusion of the coal face, wet cutting or 
spraying ; including, where used, the fitting of water feed to �ur picks, which 
i:, now a practicable proposition. 
The chain type of conveyor used in 4th Xorth Di�trict undoubtedly created 
additional coal du�t, due to the grindmg action of the chain 011 the conveyor 
pans and to the eScape at the pan joints of some of the dust on to the roadways. 
Firedamp Detectors. 1 have already mentioned \hat there were no firedamp 
detectors other than the deputy's oil lamp in the 4th �orth DI�trict on the 
shift of the explosIOn. Safety lamps were not required in any of the seams at 
this mine by \'irtue of Section 32 (I) (a) of the Coal Mines Act, and detectors 
of the automatic type were nut in use, but the other requirements of the Coal 
Mines General Hegulations (Firedamp Detectors) 1939 were applied to both 
safety lamp sections and to the 4th North District, which, it should be recalled, 
was in the open light section of Morrison North ; and high candJe power 
flame �afety lamps were carried in addition as gas detectors by appointed 
workmen in the proportion laid down by these Regulations. 
[t has been an in�truclion for some years past at this mine for each deputy 
to record the names on his statutory report of all persons carrying gas detectors, 
and as far as the matter can be checked up with the lamprooll1 records this 
rule was carried out generally, including the 4th North District. 
[ am nut able to account for the apparently strange coincidence that none 
of the men had gas detectors in this district at the time, but it may well be 
not unconnected with the earlier and varying times of the commencement of 
the night shift on Fridays and with deputy Estell's late arrival on duty. The 
lampman on �hift had apparently without question given the workmen the 
only type of lamp they had asked for. 1\linto, a survivor working in the 
Straight Ea!:!t gate, states that his mate \Vestgarth had a flame lamp on the 
back shift, but he could not say why he had not brought onc Ofi' the night 
!:!hift. 
However, careful observation for firedamp seems hardly consistent with 
promi<;cuous smoking and I think it unlikely that the presence of gas detectors 
in the dbtricl would have obviated the explosion. 
One of the workmen appointed to use a gas detector stated at the Inquest 
that he had seen diagrams of gas caps but had never seen a real gas cap. 
Mr. \'crnon Richards, \\'orkmen's InspectC'r, suggested that as far as possible 
arrangements should be made to enable these persons to see a real firedamp 
cap in the pit on a reduced flame. This may 110t be practicable in some 
in!:.tances, but morc might be done in this direction with advantage, and I 
commend I he suggest ion to managers. 
Searchil1g of JVorkmen. It is doubtful if safety lamps were legally requi�ed 
in any part of this mine, but in any event Section 35 o� the Act was applied 
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in its entirety to all sections or districts in which safety lamps were in use, 
including the 4th. North Di:.trict, as a voluntary precaution by t h<." management : 
and the standard selective system, with a quartelly general search (which wa.., 
last carried out throughout the mine on 28th July), had been in force since 
'941. 
The general arrangements for searching have since been checked and found 
satisfactory but the usual complications arising from " mixed " lights were 
present in respect of the Morrison North shaft, where the ..Jth North District 
workmen" using safety lamps intermingled with other workmen of the open 
light aleas. This difficulty was overcome by fixing warning notice board� 
along the haulage road leading to the 4th North Dh.trict , beyond which open 
lights and contraband were prohibited, and many of the workmen were searched 
at this point by the overmen, who were responsible generally for searching 
all the main shifts of ' .... orkmen at the mine ; but owing to continuous working 
and the different times of commencement of the Sllifts in this district from the 
normal working shifts elsewhere ovcrmen werc not always available at this 
point, and the deputies' kist was regarded as the main searching station for 
the 4th ).l'orth District. Here a selection of the men were searched by the 
deputy on shift, who admitted them t o  their work and who recorded on his 
statutory report the number of persons he had searched. 
Following an explosion of firedamp at \Vatergate Colliery, Durham. on 
3rd July last, involving two lives and due to illegal smoking. the Group Agent 
had impressed on all his managers the need Cor thorough searching, and tbis 
in turn was stressed with the officials and the deputies, but the amount of 
contraband found after the explosion proves hew futile and ineffecti" e the 
method of searching was, at any rate on this night shift in the . .J1h North 
District. Two of the victims whom deputy Hebden stated he had searched 
at the kist were afterwards found to have cont raband on them. Tt can only 
be concluded that some members of the night shift were in the habit of smoking 
at their place of work and that the deputies must have been aware of this ; • 
in fact, the finding of so many spent matches at their kist suggests that they 
themselves were guilty of this practice. purthermore, it is difficult to see 
how the overmen concerned could have failed to detect smoking carried on 
to such an extent. The fact , however, that spent matches had been replaced 
. in some of the tins of contraband indicates that some of the men, at any rate. 
had been careful not t o  leave any evidence of smoking behind. 
The method of searching was clearly much too perfunctory in respect of 
the 4th North district, but admittedly no degree of searching can be reaU)f 
effective without the co-operation of the workmen concerned. In this instance 
it is difficult to a\'oid drawing the conclusion that there was connivance in 
this matter of smoking between the dcputies and the workmcn. It is, I am 
afraid, not unlikely that the under-officials, who would be fully aware the 
district was on safety lamps for a reason not connected with �afety, failed to 
do their part in stamping out the natural tendency to smoke of workmen 
used to open light conditions. • 
This deplorable state of things was certainly not consistent with the high 
standard of safety and discipline which has always been the aim of the manage­
ment of this group, and I attribute this lack of discipline in the 4th North 
District revealed by the explosion to have been a consequcntial effect of 
" mixed light " conditions. 
VetltiiaiioPl arraugemetlts. The single cloth on the Straight East gate 
to separate the main intake from the North Heading return airway was bad 
practice and not in cor;npliancc with No. IO (1) (b) of the new Ventilation General 
• 
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Regulations which came into force on 1st August last. Arrangements for 
splitting the air were practically completed and this would have cut out the 
North. Heading as an airway, but owing to its proximity to the main intake 
t his connection with the return airway should have been dispensed with at 
a much earlier stage in the development of the district. It is true the \Vembley 
connection had, meanwhile, established the ventilation of the 2nd East face 
and the other inbye faces but it had the effect of placing the Straight East 
between two very heavily regulated airways and any disturbance of the cloth 
would therefore have a morc scrious effect on the ventilation of this part of 
the district ; and I do not think this aspect of the position was fully realised 
by the officials. Admittedly, the cloth was found apparently unaffected by 
the explo�ion, but nevertheless, I consider toat it  may well have had some 
bearing on the occurrence of firedamp in this part of the district. The uncertain 
character of the regulating arrangement at the \Vembley connection is also 
open to criticism. . 
The availability of an abundant supply of fresh air (due to the proximity 
of the district to the upcast shaft) doubtless accounted for the fact that canvas 
cloths only were in use for coursing the air current around the district. 
V[-F[NAL OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
(r) The disquieting feature of this explosion was the ready propagation of 
the flame by coal dust along road ways on which conveyors had either been 
used or were in use, and there seems little doubt from the evidence left by the 
explosion that after having been initiated by firedamp it received its main 
" kick-off " by a coal dust explosion about the loading point on the 2nd East 
gate. 
The treatment of coal dust on conveyor roadways in seams where the coal 
is friable and the natural conditions are dry, so maintained as to be at all 
limes in compliance with the Coal Dust H.egulations, is admittedly a difficult 
problem and onc for which, as I have already stated, the only effective remedy 
is prevention of du�t at the source by means of water. r therefore recommend 
that more active steps should be taken at the more dusty collieries to adopt 
this method in onc or more of its different forms at the coal face. 
These measures are now being taken at many collieries, more e�pecially in 
South \Vales, in an endeavour to reduce the hazard from pneumokoniosis, . 
and in curtailing the 'explosion hazard from coal dust they serve a dual purpose 
in health and safety. 
(2) The danger from coal du:::>t on disused roadways was demonstrated by 
this explosion and I would stress the necessity for adequate treatment of 
!:.>uch roads so long as they remain accessible, as required by the Coal Dust 
Regulations ; and that when these roads become un travellable they should 
either be scaled off or "otherwise protected by a substantial barrage of stone 
du�t at each end. 
(3) In view of the increased hazard from coal dust brought about by 
mechanised mining, r further recommend that in respect of No. 10 of the Coal 
Dust Regulations the Modification Order of 1939 made under the Defence 
Regulations, 1939, be revoked to allow th(' mintmum percentages of incombus­
tible matter laid down by the Schedule to Regulation 3 to have full application 
in the case of coals having a volatile matter content exceeding 27 per cent. 
(4) The igniting cause of this explosion can, in the last analysis. be attributed 
t o  . .  mixed light " conditions, and I recommend that unless the different 
sections of workmen are completely segregated from the surface inbye the 
use of open lights should be prohibited in any mine where safety lamps have 
been introduced into any part (other than as a temporary precaution). 
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(5) The potential danger of an emission of fin.!li.1mp from 1he intervening 
strata due to the conCllrn!llt working of a lowl'r seam or .... �'ams nct'(b to be 
empha-.I-;t=d anll a careilll walC ..h ::.hould be kept for ::'Udl a u)IIlingcJlcy. ��pt'Lially 
in that part of the workings o\'crlyillg the abutment areas of coal ribs in the 
lower working, to enable �uita1Jlc precautions to be taken in time. 
(0) J c(lll .... ider it expedient that the searching of persons for contraband should 
be made compulsory in all mines Of parts of mines in which safety lamps afC 
used, whether or not they arc required by the Coal Mine .... Act, 19I I .  
( 7 )  Lastly, the qu�tion u f  inculcating a !"-afctr lamp outlook among:-.t the 
mil1l'rs of :-;orth \\"c.,t ami �tid Durham in particular remains to be tackled. 
Many of thest: men 11a\ e at :-.ome t1mCNother workcu undcropcn light (oncilliull ..... 
and foUowing a change of mine or the later aduptiun of safety lamps at mines 
previously un op!:n ligllts. t hey find it difficult to give up old and ingrained 
habits of smoking while at work ; hen e their apparent indifference to, and 
disregard of. rules prohibiting the taking of contraband below bround. 
Tt is a sad reflection on Durham that four explosions of fireda mp, each 
involving loss of life. which have occurred in the county during the pa�l l;ighteen 
months have been due to contraband ; and in the ca� of a fifth explo:,ion, 
in 1944, probably due to sparking at coal face switchgear, contraband was 
found on the body of the victim. 
T am well aware this question of contraband has exercised the minds of the 
representatives of the workmen for some time, but I sugge::,t they shculd 
intensify their efforts to overcome the apathy of many of their members to 
this menace to the safety of the Durham mines. 
Ti is fitting to conclude this Report with a reference to the excellent work 
done by the three deputies Younger, Shanley and Robinson, and Overman 
Hutchinson, immediately after the explosion. These men were called upon 
to take what, in the circumstances, might be described as a judicious rbk 
of a further explosion. and they acted with commendable promptitude and 
courage, and displayed great resourcefulness and circumspection. At no 
time were they tempted to do anything foolhardy, and it is to their great 
credit that not only did they discover and bring out to fresh air five badly 
injured men and ensure prompt first-aid attention to them but they also 
satisficd themselvcs at an early stage there were no other persons remaining 
alive in the district. High tributes to their conduct well' paid at the Tnqut'!<.l 
by the Coroner and a1l the representatives of the various parties. The National 
Coal Board have formally recommended that recognition be given to these 
men for their work, and a case is now being prepared by the Divisional Inspector 
for your consideration. 
r desire to express my thanks to the local Mines Inspectorate and the staff 
of the Research and Testing Branch for their valuable assistance ; and 
to the National Coal Board and the representatives of the officials, deputies 
and workmen for their helpfulness during my investigation. I would abo 
like to express my appreciation and thanks to the National Coal Board for 
the excellent plans prepared by Mr. S. Bott and his surveying staff, which were 
a feature of the Inque�t. 
[ have the honour to be, Sir, 




J f tarold Talbot 
2 AlfreJ Bad�}' . 
3. Edmund WC!>tgarth 
4. John E:;lell 
5. Thomas !\Tcl{cvcr 
6 Waiter Roe , .. 
7. Francis E. �lartin " 
S Thoma" W. Applcby 
9 John Howland 
ro. Gerald Moore 
1 1 .  \Villlam Reed . .  
Thomas Bell (No. I) 
13. Joseph S. lfodJ;l'son 
14. Thomas Bell (No. 2) 
15- Norman f"cnwick 
16. Joseph Chapman 
17. Calm Simp:;on 
18 Heginald L. Brown . 
19 John Crimley 
20. Wilham Huthcdord 
Robert W, Blrtlc 
INIURED 
I .  ClcmCLlt Minto 
1. \VIlliarn H Johnson 
3. J amcs KIIIg-allon 
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.6 Datal Hand 
.8 Datal Hand 
Datal Hand 
.5 Stoncman 
5 ' Stonl'man 
" Datal Hand 
37 Datal Iland 
. .  Datal Hand 
,8 Sloncman 
.9 Conveyor l\lovcr 
3' Con\'eyor ;\[over 
37 Conveyor �Io\"cr 
'9 Stone man 
3' Stone man 
4 '  Ston('man 
" �toneman 




SA�IPLES 0.' )1I:"l'E DUST COLLECTED IN 4TH :NORTH DISTRICT ON 26TH AUGUST, 1947. 
In' \JR. n. N, FORSTER, H M. ASSISTANT INSPECTOR OF �hN&S 
Lenglll of Roadway 
)laiLl Drift from (la to 1 1 0 ycli>. from ofIUkes at top : 
Ploor 
H.oof and Sid('s . . .  . .. . . .  . . .  . .. 
Straight Ea .. t Gak, from 10 to 60 yds back from face : 
noor 
Sides . 
Hoof . . .  ... . .  . . ... . . .  . .. 
Eou.t "Iotor i3Qrd, from South Hcadmg 50 yds. up gate : 
Floor , . .  
Roof and Sidl!s . , . .  , . . . .. . . .. 
South Headlllg, from 2nd East Gate to 50 yds, inbye : 
Floor 
Sides , 
Hoof . ,.. . . . .., ' " . . . , .. 
3rd West Bord, from 1 0  to 60 yds. from South Heading : 
Floor 
Sides . 
Roof . .  , . .. , . . . . . . . . . . , .. . , 
4th West Bord, from 10 to 60 yds up from South Heading : 
Floor , . .  
noof and Sides . . .  . . , . . .  . .. , . . 
2nd East Gatt', from South Heading 50 yds. up gate : 
Floor " .  
Hoof and Sides . .  , , . .  . . , . . .  . . . 
5th West Bard, from South Headmg 50 yds. up gate : 
Floor . , ' 
Roof and Sides 
(616:fi) WI • •  6U,\-282 )'.8 0.1.. 
R�slllt of A "alysis 
Per Cent, 
1410islljr4 /11(0111' 
Plus CO, b'fStibl� 
Ash .MclfUr 
56· I 5 7 ' 1  
8 : h �  8 3 ' S  
4 6 ' 9  ' · 7  49·6 
64' 9 , . , 67' I 
)5 ' ) ..3 7 ' 5  
25'0 2 ' 5  2 7 ' 5  
56'5 • · 8  58 , )  
51 . ) 5 2 ' 5  
6 " 0 . · 2 6 2 ' 2 
5 2 ' 5  0 · 8  53 ' )  
2 3 ' 2  ! ' o  2 5 ' 2  
4) ' 9  • · 8  45 ' 7  
47 ' 4 0 · 7  48' , 
2 2 ' 9  • · u  2 4 ' 5  
54 ' 7  o " �  55'5 
2 ) ' 0  0 · 7 2 3 ' 7  
39 ' 8 • · 8 04 1 ' {' 
4" 7 • · 6  
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